Criminal Law—Partnerships—Statutory Construction.—United States v. A & P Trucking Co. et al. by Cotter Jr, William A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 14
10-1-1959
Criminal Law—Partnerships—Statutory
Construction.—United States v. A & P Trucking
Co. et al.
William A. Cotter Jr
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William A. Cotter Jr, Criminal Law—Partnerships—Statutory Construction.—United States v. A & P
Trucking Co. et al., 1 B.C.L. Rev. 109 (1959), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol1/iss1/14
CASE NOTES
is no reasonable relation between it and the value of a key executive's
services.8 In the principal case, however, it was pointed out that earnings
are the chief determinative factor of a stock's market price, at least in the
long run. There being no question that an executive's services are related
to corporate earnings, the court felt that it was unable to say that there is
no relation between those services and the market price of the corporation's
stock.
The latter view seems to be the better one. Compensation must be
reasonably related to the value of an executive's services, but the determina-
tion of what is reasonable is usually left to the discretion and business
judgment of the board of directors." In order to prevail, therefore, the
plaintiff would have to show that a reasonable man would find the "unit"
plan indefensible. Yet the "unit" plan is not unlike stock option plans
which have found approval in the courts.5 The financial reward in each
plan is identical, both being based on the increase of the market price of
the corporation's stock. It is difficult, therefore, to understand why the
"unit" plan is more unreasonable than a stock option plan. In the opinion
of this commentator, the view expressed in Lieberman v. Koppers Co., Inc .°
is clearly justifiable.
CHARLES C. WINCHESTER, JR.
Criminal Law—Partnerships--Statutory Construction—United States
v. A f P Trucking Co. et ai. 1—The United States appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, 2 from rulings of the U.S.
District Court of New Jersey dismissing two in formations3 charging partner-
ships as entities with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 835 and 49 U.S.C. § 322(a). 4
The basis of the dismissal in each case was that a partnership as an entity
is not subject to criminal liability under the statutes. On appeal' the
Supreme Court, Harlan, J., unanimously held that there is nothing in the
nature of a partnership as an entity to exempt it from criminal responsibility
where Congress intended it to be so responsible. So holding, the court
faced the further problem of whether or not Congress by these statutes
intended partnerships to be criminally responsible. Traditionally partner-
ships qua partnership have been, and still are at common law, regarded
3 Id. at 86.
4 Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 349-351 (D. Del., 1948) ; Clamitz v. Thatcher
Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687 (2d Cir., 1947) ; Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680
(1941).
Wyles v. Campbell, ibid.; Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., ibid.
6 Op. cit. supra note 1.
1 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
2 A statute allowing the United States the right of direct appeal where an informa-
tion is dismissed on the basis of statutory construction.
8 Informations numbered 252-56 and 261-56.
4 A & P Trucking Co. was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 835 and 49 U.S.C.
§ 322(a) ; Hopla Trucking Co. was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 835.
6 Both cases were consolidated for argument.
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as immune from criminal proceedings on the •basis that a partnership can
have no legal existence' apart from its several individual partners.° The
decisions of the Supreme Court; however, recognize • in Congress the power
to change the common 'law and subject to criminal prosecution bodies
which at common law are exempt.? This being so, the ultimate question
before the court was whether or not Congress manifested an intent to so
change the common law in each of the statutes.8
49 U.S.C. § 322(a) (Motor Carrier Act) provides 'in substance that
any "person" knowingly and willfully violating any 'provision of this act
shall be subject to a fine. "Person" is defined in § 303(a) to include partner.
ships. .The court unanimously held' that • Congress by that section expressly
changed the common law.° 18' U.S.C. § 835 is similar in; coverage to •49
U.S.C. 322(a) except. that "whoever" is . used rather than "person!!
"Whoever" is undefined in Title 18:' Therefore, a partnership is not expressly
included within § 835 as it is in' the Motor Carrie': Act. However, five
justices reached the-same conclusion as to coverage of "whoever." 1 U.S.C.
§ 1,10
 provides that in construing acts of Congress "whoever" shall, 'unless
the context of the act indicates otherwise, include a' partnership:" Once the
intent of Congress to treat the partnership as an entity is present, the entity
can be charged with the requisite knowledge through the doctrine of Re-
spondeat Superior."
The construction given to 18 U.S.C. § 835 by the majority was opposed
by foilr justices who Were of the opinion that 'such a well-accepted 'principle
of 'American law as 'the' aggregate' theory of , partnerships can be changed
only by expressed• language of Congress. To simply imply such a purpose
to Congress, especially in a penal statute requiring culpable 'intent, where
the partners themselves are innocent;-is to ignore the rule of strict construc-
tion of penal• statutes. The innocent partners could not be 'held liable
criminally for acts or 'knowledge of the partnership employees. 12 Since under
the universally accepted rules of 'Partnership law," a partnerShip is nothing
but an aggregate of individuals, it too should be held. not criminally respon-
sible where the partners are innocent. Only when Congress expressly com-
mands should the result be different. •
The result of the Court in . holding that partnership's as' entities are
capable of being punished when Congresi expressly 'commands Cannot be
questioned. The result reached by the majority where parnerships are not
;	 •
8 Faulkner v. Whitaker, 15 N.J.L., 438 (1836) ; XL Liquors v. Taylor, 17 N.J. 444,
111 A.2d 753 (1955) ; People v. Schonieg, 74 Cal. App. 109, 110, 239 Pac. 413, 414;
Crane, Partnerships 9-12 (2cl% ed. 1952). The Uniform Partnership Act rejects the entity
theory except for limited procedural purposes. . •
7 United States v. Adams Express Co., 229 U.S. 381 (1913).
8 United States v. A & P Trucking Co., et al., 358 U.S. 121, 124. ,• a T
0 Ibid.-	 '	 •
10 An act entitled Rules of Construction. 	 •
11 United States v. A & P Trucking Co., .supra note 8, at .125; Sayre, Criminal
Responsibility for the Acts of Another,'43'Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1930).
	 ,
12 Gordon v. United States,' 347 U.S. 909 (1954). •
13 See note 6 supra.
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expressly included seems well founded by the
	 of 1 U.S.C. § 1 and the
theory of necessary implication.';
WILLIAM A. COTTER, JR.
Eminent' Domain—What Constitutes an Interference Sufficient to Con-
stitute a Taking.—Cities Service Oil Co. et al. v. City of New York.'
—An action was .brought: by the owner and the lessee of a gasoline station
to enjoin .the City of New. York and the New York Transit Authority, from
locating and maintaining bus stops in front of the entrances to the station
which 'was. located on the corner of two' streets; with. an
 entrance on 'each.
The Supreme Court; Kings County dismissed the..complaint,.the dismissal
being affirmed by•the Appellate Division, Seccind Judicial Department and
The Court'of Appeals. HELD:.That the .temporary and partial blocking of
the entrances .did not. constitute a taking of property, 'being merely . an
interferehce with a use orproperty of the type that must be borne by the
land owner, for. the larger. benefit- of the community and the general public.
The distinction•is to ,be draWn between eminent domain which involves
the taking of property for public use, and regulation or interference with
property falling short of a taking? The Cities Service case falls .into the
latter category.' Although the principle •
 by itself is relatively. simple,, the
application' of 'thiS principle to concrete. cases is much more •difficult since
it is a question of 'degree of interference.' ... • ,
In determining whether there has or has not been an , interference
amounting to a taking, each. case must be decided on; its own. facts. There
was no taking when the state rerouted traffic, although• the result adversely
affected• established business. 3 In Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses,'
Cited with approval in Cities Service, a more onerous burden was placed on
the plaintiff when left turns and U-turns were so limited that one entering
the parkway from plaintiff's property and desiring . ,to ,,travel. northward
was compelled to drive in the opposite direction' for five miles .before he,
could turn around. This case, like Cities Service, was , dismissed. When
however, in Holmes v. State,5 a street was closed not leaving a suitable
14 united States v. A & P Trucking Co., et al., supra note 8, at I24: , "The con=
elusion is not lightly to be reached that Congress intended that some carriers should not
be subject to the full gamut of sanctions—merely because of the form under which they
were organized to do business."; United States v. Adams Express Co., supra note 7, at
389-390, where the court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. 835 applied to joint stock companies
without the aid of 1 U.S.C. 1 holding, "But if it [the statute] imposes upon them the
duties under the words 'common carrier' as interpreted, ,it is reasonable to suppose
that the same words are intended to impose upon them the penalty . ."
1 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d 814 (1958).
2 Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 53 N.E. 910 (1899) ; Pendsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon et al., 260 U.S..393 (1922) ; Wolff 'v. Mortgage Commissia,.270 N.Y. 428, 1
N.E.2d 835 (1936) ; Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.3 (3rd ed. 1950).
3 Clark County v. Mitchell, 223 Ark. 404, 266 S.W.2d 831 (1954) ; People 4. SaYig,
101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d 702 (Ct. App. 1st D. 1951).
4 268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935).. 	 •
5 282 App. Div. 278, 123':N.Y.S.2d 179 (1953).
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